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Affect Theory 
Karen Simecek 
Abstract 
This chapter reviews important publications in affect theory from 2016. This chapter is 
divided into the following sections: 1. Introduction; 2. Utility of affect, which focuses 
on Obstruction (Nick Salvato); 3. Environmental affect, which focuses on Mirror Affect 
(Cristina Albu) and Ambient Media (Paul Roquet); 4. Gesture, which focuses on 
‘Touching the Button’ (Lyndsay Reckson), The Minor Gesture (Erin Manning) and 
Gestures of Testimony (Michael Richardson); 5. Reflections. In publications this year, 
there has been a significant interest in intersubjective and interpersonal affect which 
relates to the phenomena of shared emotions as well as the politics of affect in the 
emergence of studies of gesture. Since this is the inaugural chapter on affect theory for 
YWCCT, the opening introductory section offers a note on the rise of this dynamic and 
evolving field. 
 
1. Introduction 
The last twenty-five years has seen a rise in interest in the study of affect, with greater 
attention to the non-linguistic aspects of experience, since the so-called ‘affective turn’ in 
critical theory. 2016 saw two major developments in affect theory, with the launch of two 
new book series that will continue to develop this fascinating area of critical and cultural 
theory: Palgrave Studies in Affect Theory and Literary Criticism, edited by Adam Frank 
and Joel Faflak, which included Shame and the Aging Woman by J. B. Bouson, and The 
Seduction of Fiction by J. Vernay both in 2016; and from Duke University Press, Thought 
in the Act, edited by Erin Manning and Brian Massumi, and beginning with Erin 
Manning’s The Minor Gesture (about which I say more below).  
Recent developments in neuropsychology and neurobiology 1  have suggested an 
importance in the role of affect in cognition. Consequently, it is now widely accepted in 
the field of neuroscience that the cognitive functions of the brain do not operate in 
isolation, but that our affective and cognitive functions work in tandem, responding to 
and shaping one another. There is no such thing as ‘pure’ thinking; all cognition comes 
with feeling. Not only is both cognition and affect present in our subjective experience of 
the world but affect shapes cognition and vice versa.  
In thinking about affect, it is important to separate out the diverse ways in which this is 
embedded in aesthetic experience and experience of human life from the subtlety of 
background mood to the affective aspect of movement and action, and its significance for 
the political and ethical. Ultimately, what is talked about in talking about ‘affect’ is felt 
stuff, which ranges from an intentional state (a feeling towards, about, in relation to 
something other) to something that forms the background of felt experience, which shapes 
our subjective experience and engagement with the world. There is, of course, wide 
disagreement as to whether emotion and affect are distinct categories but, at the very least, 
there is significant overlap and so it makes sense to include the emotional within the 
category of affect. 
In the study of emotion, affect, and mood, there has been a move to connect 
phenomenological analysis of affect with findings in neuroscience. For example, in 
Albu’s discussion of the use of mirrors in art in her book Mirror Affect, she connects the 
aesthetic experience afforded by certain artworks with the phenomenon of ‘mirror 
neurons’ (neurons which fire whether performing an action or observing another 
performing that action). A further example of this kind of bringing together of 
neuroscience with the phenomenology of affect is found in Blud’s Literature Compass 
article ‘Emotional Bodies: Cognitive Neuroscience and Mediaeval Studies’, which 
although drawing on the now out-dated somatic theory of emotion from Damasio (that 
holds that bodily response is prior to the emotional response), presents an interesting 
exploration of how the paradigm of the embodied mind can be a useful frame in medieval 
studies: ‘While Damasio’s work might suggest for mediaeval studies an intriguing sense 
in which affective piety offers a different understanding of rationality, the inspiration of 
the mystic’s (embodied) soul offers a response to the cognitive scientist’s wish for an 
“embodied mind”’ (p. 463). Likewise, in Obstruction, there is the theme of connecting 
affect and cognition, and seeing the two as working together. It is therefore no surprise 
that in affect theory there is greater acknowledgement of the entanglement of feeling and 
thought. 
 2. Moving beyond emotions to affective phenomenology: Salvato 
Philosophical approaches to affect have largely focused on emotion defined as having 
intentionality, that is, they have an object of focus, for instance, to be frightened is to be 
frightened of something (and for oneself or someone), but there is growing interest in 
related phenomenological states which lack such object of focus, which can be thought 
of in terms of ‘background’ feeling or mood. Two books published in 2016 provide 
significant analysis of such non-intentional states, Salvato’s Obstruction and Roquet’s 
Ambient Media (which I discuss in the next section). 
In Obstruction, Salvato explores a particular kind of affective experience, what he calls 
(a la Lars von Trier) ‘five obstructions’ of embarrassment, laziness, cynicism, slowness, 
and digressiveness – paradigmatic affective states for holding cognition and affect in 
opposition. Salvato argues that such obstructions can actually provide a fertile 
environment for creativity and productivity. However, these affective states are not 
always of value: the experience of embarrassment can lead to dismissal or suppression 
and, all too common, the experience of feeling distracted (particularly by the internet, as 
Salvato discusses), can prevent deep engagement. What Salvato offers here is an 
excellent analysis of each of these affective states to show that the picture is more 
complex. There is a large body of literature on the way in which emotion and thought 
might interact, but little on how emotion, and more broadly affective aspects of 
experience can help or hinder thought: ‘Obstruction works by torquing the phenomena 
toward the project of rethinking thinking itself’ (p. 14). For instance, although laziness 
can lead to lack of productivity, it also has the potential to free up space for a different 
kind of thinking and reflection. Salvato’s exploration of these ‘five obstructions’ offers 
a way of uncovering new modes of thought which are products of these often 
overlooked (and often assumed to be unhelpful) affective states. 
That is not to say that he takes these affective states to be misunderstood; he 
acknowledges that they can get in the way of certain projects. This is precisely why 
Salvato labels these affective states obstructions. In other words, they act as constraints 
which could represent a block to cognition but, as the literature on creativity suggests, 
such constraint can in fact enable creativity provided one is willing to work with such 
obstruction2: ‘To embrace obstruction is to scale the wall not in order to surmount it but 
to cling to it, in such a way that the subject of this “intensif[ied]” obstruction and the 
obstructive wall itself change, perhaps move, precisely because of the clinging and the 
more granularly textured feeling of, up, and against the wall that the clinging enables’ 
(p. 4). To embrace obstruction as something of value requires a change in relation to 
such obstruction; instead of trying to break down or overcome the barrier, attention is 
played to the obstruction itself. It is important to note that Salvato wants to distinguish 
the overcomable, temporary obstacle from the fixed, durable obstruction: to treat the 
obstruction as obstacle will lead to frustration.  
The study begins with a chapter on embarrassment (both being embarrassed for oneself 
and feeling embarrassment on behalf of another). Quoting Litvak, Salvato points to the 
potential utility in acknowledging and embracing what we find embarrassing in our own 
tastes:  
‘we might in fact set a better example, and be better critics,’ by mobilizing an 
Adornian sophistication that would likely give rise to embarrassment in the face 
of say, Tori Amos’ music. Ironically, this sophistication may itself ‘cause … 
embarrassment’ in the intellectual landscape in which ‘retaining our expensive 
tastes [rather than] … repudiating them’ has been routinely indicted for its 
potential (though by no means guaranteed) collusion with classical hauteur. (p. 
35) 
For Salvato, allowing a place for embarrassment in critical inquiry allows for greater 
scrutiny of taste – it is not that humans proceed with existing biases in place, but that 
they grant unsophisticated judgments of taste a role to play. This is what Salvato calls 
‘cringe criticism,’ which helps move the critic beyond an institutionalised practice. In 
order to develop this approach to criticism, he asks the following pertinent questions: 
‘what is embarrassment, exactly? What distinguishes critical embarrassment from other 
versions and varieties, chiefly everyday or “garden” ones, of the emotion?’ (p. 36) and 
what does such ‘cringe criticism’ – that embrace of the embarrassing – open up in 
critical practice that would have otherwise been overlooked? For Salvato, finding a 
place for the embarrassing helps to move beyond an institutionalised critical practice 
and helps to look again at judgments of taste across the board. 
Ultimately, as Salvato notes, embarrassment is a relational feeling; a concern for what 
others think about oneself. Embarrassment – related to empathetic response – is 
something that can be felt for others or oneself. It is, in its inherent relationality, an 
intersubjective feeling. He asks: ‘But how is this feeling, constituted by the play of self 
and other, more specifically inflected when it is experienced in the field of criticism? By 
what mechanisms or relays does critical embarrassment communicate its local 
difference from an embarrassment globally understood?’ (p. 45). ‘Cringe criticism’ 
emerges through personal engagement with art and literature with strong awareness of 
the gaze of another. Judgement is therefore problematised by being set in the context of 
other critical judgements, both of the self and those of others.  
Through his central example of the music and performances of Tori Amos, Salvato 
demonstrates the creative potential of embarrassment in how ‘living with the 
embarrassment’ can shape what follows, that is, the need to reflect back to the site of 
embarrassment as opposed to moving ‘swiftly on’. Embarrassment, therefore, leads to 
self-reflection and desire for improvement, and can act as a catalyst for creativity. 
Following this discussion of embarrassment, Salvato then moves on to provide an 
analysis of laziness. In doing so, he chooses to focus on a subset of ‘loafers and 
slackers’, namely, ‘those who philosophize “doing nothing” and who, in the process, are 
not only doing something but are also making something: thinking in transmittable 
form, almost always a form of writing’ (p. 67). His interest here is in those who 
embrace the obstruction of laziness to produce something that could only have come as 
a product of such laziness. Salvato talks about the oddity that laziness can seemingly 
produce something; a nothingness that breeds a kind of productivity. In the examples he 
offers, he argues, there is ‘an unorthodox series of makings of equally unorthodox 
pieces of writing that form the material proof that “doing nothing” may consistently 
yield something (an essay, pamphlet, a book)’ (p. 75). 
As a companion to the chapter on laziness, Salvato proceeds to focus on slowness, 
which he views as a form of ‘stretching, dilating, expanding’ time (p. 97). In providing 
an analysis of both laziness and slowness, Salvato directly connects affect with 
temporality. Experience is played out in relation to time – whether the feeling of 
spending or making time, both are fundamentally feelings with a temporal dimension: 
‘the transition from laziness to slowness, one in which spending time must give way to 
the fraught effort of saving it’ (p. 94). Slowness conceptualised in terms of taking time 
and making time thereby draw attention to the temporality of affect. And what is the 
relationship between the two? 
Slowness or taking time has a qualitative as well as quantitative aspect: Salvato gives 
the example of reading a quotation slowly, which does not merely involve taking a 
certain number of seconds to read that correspond to the number of words it contains, 
but allows a reading practice defined by a kind of careful attention. For Salvato, 
slowness can never be totally separated from quantification, since the experience of 
time necessitates some form of quantifiable measurement. Salvato explores slowness in 
relation to cinema, through the examples of Old Joy and Wendy and Lucy, both directed 
by Kelly Reichardt. Cinema as a medium is inherently related to time; it has a fixed 
duration but can give rise to the feeling of making time, and the opening up of an 
attentive space that makes that fixed duration feel dilated, which provides a greater 
depth to our engagement. 
Salvato also provides a useful analysis of digression, again noting the way in which 
such an obstruction can either be something which blocks productivity or leads to a 
different kind of productivity. He writes: ‘Whether a given digression is trivial or 
consequential, benign or shattering, to be given as a digression means, in its substance, 
to have given the step aside from an explicit or implicit course already underway’ (p. 
157). 
At first glance, digression seems at odds with Salvato’s characterisation of slowness. 
Whereas slowness seems to enable a deep kind of attention, digression appears to lead 
to a loosening of attention or surface-level attention. We can see this most clearly at the 
beginning of his analysis where he refers to Young’s study of distraction (see pp. 159-
160) and understanding of digression as a form of distraction. This presents distraction 
as the idea of being pulled from some worthwhile and particular activity, something that 
is of value and that demands attention.  
However, this affective mode also has the potential to offer a valuable form of cognitive 
activity, one that is exploratory in a more encyclopaedic manner in the search for 
linkages between things rather than a deep, meditative attention on one thing. In his 
discussion, he opens the space to think not only of unhelpful digressions but where 
digressiveness can itself be valuable. He recasts it not as a mode of inattention but as 
“the art of strolling”. He writes:  
One enlivening challenge of digressiveness—a mode of stepping aside that I 
distinguish from the conceptualization of distraction as variously ‘dragging 
away,’ ‘tear[ing] apart,’ and ‘pull[ing] asunder’—is to treat it not as an obstacle 
or impediment to focusing attention on what we should value, per Young’s 
rallying call, but as an obstruction that calls generatively into question our 
schemes of (e)valuation and forces us to recalibrate them, such that the relatively 
valuable and relatively (putatively) valueless are brought into a closer proximity, 
an altered choreography, perhaps even a dialectical interplay with another. (p. 
160) 
His comments here on digression equally apply to the other affective states he analyses. 
Whether laziness or cynicism, it seems there is a way to utilise such obstructions for 
creativity and productivity, but only by embracing them as offering valuable constraints, 
and not by treating them as presenting obstacles to dissolve or overcome. Obstruction 
makes a clear argument for the use value of affect for cognitive activity, especially, 
creativity in thinking. 
 
3. Environmental affect: Albu, Roquet 
A recent development in the philosophy of emotion and affect has been the response to 
the emergence of research from cognitive scientists on social cognition and the 
phenomenon of shared emotions.3 In short, the phenomena of shared emotion can be 
captured as minimally involving two people who are in a similar affective state, with the 
same object as the focus of their emotional response and are aware of the other as 
responding in a similar way. Such developments in cognitive science and the philosophy 
of emotion have paved the way for a shift in thinking about affect as going beyond the 
individual experience and engagement with the world to something interpersonal and 
intersubjective. Although the idea of interpersonal emotions is not new, with a large body 
of research focused on empathy and sympathy, shared emotion taps into a powerful form 
of intersubjective emotional response which is able to bind people through a kind of 
affective connection. In this section, I will focus on two notable contributions in 2016 to 
this theme of interpersonal and intersubjective affect, Ambient Media and Mirror Affect, 
both of which reflect on affect as something related to space. Both books therefore explore 
affect’s environment-shaping function and assess how this relates to interaction and 
sharing amongst people, whether navigating a busy cityscape together, or working 
together in interacting with artworks and creating an aesthetic experience. 
Roquet’s Ambient Media focuses its discussion on developments and interactions with 
ambient music, video, novels and feature films to explore the way in which such ambient 
media is able to shape experience of a shared world. In defining what counts as ‘ambient’, 
Roquet quotes Erik Satie on ‘furniture music,’ which helps to make clear the 
environmental affect that characterises the ambient:  
we must bring about music which is like furniture, a music, that is, which will be 
part of the noises of the environment, will take them into consideration. I think 
of it as melodious, softening the noises of the knives and forks, not dominating 
them, not imposing itself. It would fill up those heavy silences that sometimes 
fall between friends dining together. It would spare them the trouble of paying 
attention to their own banal remarks. And at the same time it would neutralize 
the street noises which so indiscreetly enter into the play of conversation. To 
make such a noise would respond to a need. (Satie as quoted by Roquet, p. 39) 
Ambient music and video is crafted around repetitions, edited together and looped so 
that it can function in the background in the way that a piece of furniture can shape the 
feeling of space in a room.  
In ambient video, creators/producers bring patterns and rhythms from one environment 
into another, from waterfalls to jellyfish. As Roquet notes, whereas ambient music 
(discussed in the early part of his book) is meant to sit in the background and not be 
subject to direct attention, ambient video on the other hand demands a moving in an out 
of focus of our attention. This discussion acts as a bridge to talking about ambient 
novels and feature films in the latter part of the book, where the ambient cannot sit in 
the background but is the focus of our attention as something directly acting as ‘mood 
regulation’ to frame our engagement with characters and narratives. In particular, 
ambient cinema or ‘mood cinema’ makes the atmosphere of central importance by 
allowing the mood to provide the logic of the film (or part of it) rather than relying on 
narrative to moves things forward coherently, somewhat similar to the way in which 
David Lynch’s mood sequences function, for instance, the ‘Club Silencio’ sequence in 
his Mulholland Drive (2001). 
Roquet argues that ambient media has the potential to enhance our experience of time and 
space, in particular, public space, and therefore can shape and enhance environments 
encountered in daily life. Roquet therefore places emphasis on the affective environment 
that ambient media shapes in the context of Japanese culture, which is apt for such 
exploration given the cultural value of space and environment in the Japanese garden. 
Ambient media, by providing background affective atmosphere or ‘mood’ is able to shape 
attention by ‘priming the brain to favour sensory cues reinforcing already established 
feelings’ (p. 3) and facilitate attunement ‘toward a mix of uncertain calm and drifting 
reflections, relaxation and wandering thoughts’ (p.3). Background affect is therefore able 
to shape perception and engagement with space. In developing this further, Roquet points 
to the utility of ambient music for its ability to provide rhythms to move us through space 
and time, particularly useful in helping one to get through something whether it is an 
arduous and boring journey or an exhausting run.  
On a collective level, Roquet points to how this can work to help large groups of people 
move in a compatible and efficient way. Although listening to ambient music on 
headphones in a public space might seem that it is helping the individual to retreat from 
the public space to their own private soundscape, Roquet describes this as providing 
rhythms to help navigate that public space more easily – not to escape the environment 
but to enhance it, providing citizens with a form of ‘embodied security’ by offering an 
‘organizing horizon,’ an affective framework that gives experience an underlying 
cohesion on which to hang other aspects of experience. 
The third chapter, ‘moving with the rhythms of the city,’ focuses more directly on how 
ambient media can facilitate engagement with shared space by priming social 
relationships. Roquet describes how music is used in Japan to choreograph the public to 
efficiently board and disembark trains, cross the road, and so on, by often using the 
sound of birdsong: ‘Whatever daily and yearly rhythms these birds may have originally 
had—dawn choruses and rainy-day retreats—are eliminated in favour of ensuring the 
calming affordances of their perpetual chirping presence’ (p. 78). These sounds helping 
to orientate and organise people. With such use of ambient sounds to control the ebb 
and flow of people, not only does the sound affect the movement of people but the 
movement of people affect the sounds, with frequency and level of noise at its peak at 
peak commuting times. This enables efficient movement in one of the world’s busiest 
cities, the people of Tokyo are able to navigate around one another with ease and 
significantly reduced levels of stress. What enables such complex movement on such a 
large scale is what Roquet calls ‘rhythmic attunement’.  
Ambient media facilitates cosubjectivity, that is, a social relation characterised by 
individuals coming to have similar feelings and behaviour, but not as a consequence of 
interpersonal relationships; they form them individually, but in response to some public 
or shareable phenomena. Cosubjectivity can be thought as living one’s individual life in 
amongst the crowds of other individuals, allowing preservation of the individual to 
navigate a busy city. He argues: ‘Cosubjective modes [as opposed to intersubjective] are 
most prevalent in crowded urban spaces designed around flexibility and mobility – in 
other words, the neoliberal city. In these contexts the strategic use of media allows other 
people to contribute to a shared energy and collective orientation without ever 
demanding the foreground attention themselves’ (p. 134). Roquet relates this to what he 
calls the ‘aesthetics of subtraction’, where the value is in anonymity and neutrality (as 
with some forms of minimalism) to allow objects to fall into the background and no 
longer compete to be the focus of our attention, best exemplified by the store Muji 
which offers objects for use in daily life from forks and knives to clothing for a ‘low-
affect lifestyle’. The use of such an aesthetic is to facilitate cosubjectivity and ‘always 
be ready to engage with whatever and whomever comes along next’ (p. 138) without 
reducing to an object of desire or disgust. 
However, such demand for attunement does not always have benefits for individual 
citizens, even if when working well it enables a city to work efficiently. Where 
individuals fall out of rhythm, it leads to withdrawal and isolation from society. Given 
the relationship between the affective shaping effect of ambience on space, Roquet 
notes the political dimension of mood: ‘Every atmosphere includes a largely 
imperceptible border demarcating who can move seamlessly within it and who is made 
to feel uncomfortable, out of place, abject. Learning to trace out these transparent lines 
is a crucial part of making the air legible’ (p. 16). Roquet talks about the need to learn to 
‘read the air’ or become attuned to the atmosphere in order to appreciate what is 
acceptable within that space but this equally limits the possibility for challenging the 
status quo.  
A further theme in the book is the relationship between ambient media and therapy 
culture, such as the rise in playlists for energising, relaxation, reflection: ‘Ambient 
media fulfils the therapy culture imperative for calming affect, providing a sense of 
restfulness and relaxation for the humans spending time with them’ (p. 18). Ambient 
media, music, literature and film adhere to the principles of the Japanese garden as a 
place for relaxation and, most importantly, reflection, by creating ‘mood spaces’, which 
act to regulate mood to enable thinking and reflection: ‘ambient works open up spaces 
within the overall calm to register a wider range of emotional uncertainty, even anxiety. 
By affording a calm both effective and indeterminate, ambient media sets up the 
possibility for an equanimous reflection on larger and potentially threatening 
externalities” (p. 18). But Roquet’s criticism of such therapeutic/healing atmosphere is 
that it is limited to what is compatible with ‘calmness’ and so shuts off certain avenues 
of thought: ‘Recognizing these limitations, however, can lead to a better understanding 
of what role calm and comfort might play as part of a socially responsive literature’ (p. 
176). 
Albu’s Mirror Affect is also concerned with the role of affect in shaping interaction in 
public space, but is focused on public engagement with works of art: ‘artworks that put 
the behaviour of visitors on display provide occasions for retrieving a sense of physical 
proximity to others’ (p. 30). Albu gives the example of how Ken Lum’s installation, Pi, 
in an underground passageway in Vienna, simultaneously interrupts the flow of people 
through the passageway whilst encouraging their movement through. Whereas Ambient 
Media is centrally concerned with environmental affect as a background shaping of 
human interaction, Mirror Affect emphasises the role of human interaction in generating 
affect through group dynamics that emerge in response to ‘mirrored’ works of art. 
Mirror Affect makes a significant contribution to the topic of shared affect and shared 
emotion by bringing the notion of ‘shared’ and ‘community’ to the level of affective 
engagement and response by investigating shared and interpersonal responses to 
installation artworks whether in the gallery or public spaces, with particular emphasis on 
participatory or audience-dependent works. Often, such discussion is limited in terms of 
understanding the potential of affective response in determining a relationship to another 
by focusing on empathy and sympathy. Yet what we see in the artworks discussed in 
Mirror Affect is a sharing with other spectators and sharing in the problematising of space 
that such installation works generate. The important thing is that we have further 
investigation into this phenomenon so that we recognise that notions of empathy and 
sympathy do not capture the richness and variety in collective affective response. 
Albu makes clear the interpersonal nature of reflective and responsive artworks which 
gives rise to what she calls ‘mirror affect’, that is, the ‘intense bodily experience triggered 
by reflective or responsive artworks, which encourage participants to take note of their 
collective physical presence as well as of their interpersonal perception and behaviour’ 
(p. 6). We can therefore see this as a richer notion of affect that points to an important 
shift from individual response and experience to something shared and shareable with 
others. However, as the book develops, she complicates this notion of ‘mirror affect’ as 
something which is shared in the sense of two people mirroring their affective response 
and expands it to capture a binding of affect, something like cosubjectivity, whereby the 
individual self is reflected in the relationship to others: ‘The term mirror affect is 
essentially an oxymoron: on the one hand, it suggests a perfect correspondence, similar 
to that existing between a person and his or her reflection in a non-distorting mirror; on 
the other hand, it points to the ineluctable differences that exist between self and others 
despite strong connections’ (p. 257). 
Such experience of collective affect impacts the individual self since it facilitates a move 
away from understanding oneself in individual terms. But Albu wants to talk in terms of 
group dynamics rather than forming communities, since she takes it that viewers can 
respond to one another and shape their experience in relation to one another without the 
strong bond found within a community. A group dynamic can dissolve as quickly as it 
emerged; it can undulate rather than develop on a singular trajectory. Where affect takes 
on a more intersubjective flavour, works can highlight peculiarly collective affect such as 
social tension or the feeling of collaboration in the absence of community. In doing this 
work, Albu focuses on participatory works which emphasise working groups of spectators 
as opposed to the introspective spectator, in other words, the work cannot be experienced 
and appreciated without interacting with other audience members. The emphasis here is 
on interaction rather than participation; it is more about the audience interacting with one 
another (sometimes facilitated by or merely mirrored in the work itself) rather than 
multiple series of individuals interacting with the work. Albu therefore highlights a 
performative role for spectator in the gesture of ‘mirroring acts’. 
For Albu, mirroring can be understood in terms of three different affective processes: 
‘Observing their reflection in relation to those of other viewers; Purposefully or 
incidentally behaving in the same way as other viewers; and Imagining themselves in the 
positions of others’ (p. 17). Albu offers a range of examples of artworks that highlight 
each of these types of mirroring: ‘Artworks that conspicuously show viewers to 
themselves as they collectively experience shared fields of sensory stimuli stage 
perceptual scenarios that allow for the recognition of undeniable differences in affective 
and behavioural responses’ (p. 17). She focuses on artworks that have reflective 
properties, whether consisting of mirrored surfaces or responsive features, such as 
Rauschenberg’s Mud Muse, in which viewers see the increasingly dynamic mud bubbles 
as a consequence of the collective noise produced in the gallery. In Robert Morris’ 
sculptures, with his use of mirrors, viewers’ awareness of their own reflections does not 
produce a renewed self-interest, but instead the self is considered in relation to others as 
an object of joint viewing, which enables viewers ‘to imagine multiple ways of seeing’ 
(p. 38). 
In her discussion of responsive artworks in her chapter on ‘Mirror Frames’, Albu delves 
deeper into this idea of connecting with others by pointing to an interesting form of affect 
that is formed in response to the experience generated by other participants. In the context 
of Dan Graham’s 1976 installation, Public Space/Two Audiences, she comments that ‘he 
argued that art viewers are generally invited to identify with art objects and to ignore the 
social and institutional dimension of art galleries. This tendency, he asserted, diminishes 
self-awareness and renders viewers oblivious to the conditions of perception’ (p. 139). In 
response, Public Space/Two Audiences resisted attempts by viewers to adopt an external 
viewpoint, since the installation consisted of two rooms separated by a sound-proofed 
glass wall, with a mirrored wall at one end of one of the rooms, thus forming two groups 
of spectators who can only ever look at one another from within a particular space and 
can only hear what’s happening in one room: ‘By introducing individuals into public 
situations that solicited responses or at least some sort of visual interaction with variable 
environments or social situations, [Graham] endeavoured to challenge the boundaries 
between a seemingly autonomous private self and a socialised self’ (p. 145).  She also 
notes that viewers would imitate one another’s gestures, which she connects with the idea 
of mirror neurons: ‘As we watch the gestures of someone else, the same neutrons fire in 
our brains as if we were performing their actions ourselves’ (p. 196). This, Albu describes 
as a process of affective attunement; not simply a mimicking or mirroring but as 
something developed together and in response to one another. 
Similarly, in her chapter ‘mirror intervals’, Albu focuses on large scale mirror 
installations such as Anish Kapoor’s Sky Mirror (2001), Olafur Eliasson’s The Weather 
Project (2003) and Doug Aitken’s Mirror (2013). She argues that such large-scale 
responsive and ‘mirrored’ artworks resist being treated as an autonomous object because 
they are situated in busy public spaces making it rare to be looking at solitary human 
reflection and therefore difficult to detach from the human images reflected in them. She 
writes: ‘By fostering interpersonal relations between viewers engaged in aesthetic 
contemplation, these works are anything but autonomous art objects and show that we, as 
individuals, are anything but autonomous from each other or the spaces we inhabit’ (pp. 
155-6), since these works afford the richest aesthetic experience when viewing others 
through them. 
Throughout the book there are references to a kind of affect directed towards others, or 
created by a collective dynamic. This should not be viewed as a form of emotional 
intentionality, but rather a feeling that emerges from awareness of others, or affective 
reactivity. As a consequence of the group dynamic that emerges in the engagement with 
such audience-dependent artworks, viewers develop a sense of connectedness, or 
intimacy, in virtue of merely being a member of that group with its collective agency, 
response and experience.  
 
4. Gesture: Reckson, Manning and Richardson 
In this section, I turn to the theme of gesture that was the focus of a number of works 
published in 2016, most notably Lyndsay Reckson’s ‘Touching a Button’, Erin 
Manning’s The Minor Gesture, and Michael Richardson’s Gestures of Testimony. These 
works contribute a significant development in affect studies by moving beyond 
connecting affect to cognition (the feeling of thinking) by extending it to action (the 
feeling of doing). 
Reckson’s article, ‘Touching a Button’ provides a good example of the exploration of 
gesture and the affective aspects of bodily movement. How should we understand 
‘gesture’? Not only is it something with a significant felt quality, but it is something 
enacted and embodied, an action that is felt prior to clear articulation in thought. To ‘touch 
a button’, as Reckson highlights in her paper, is a performed action that brings something 
to an end and therefore carries great significance. Reckson’s view of touching a button as 
a gesture runs counter to Agamben, who writes that in gesture ‘nothing is being produced 
or acted, but rather something is being endured and supported’.4 Yet Reckson illuminates 
the connection between this gesture of touching a button and the temporal since it is this 
‘felt’ act that brings about a moment of finality and so does not ‘endure’ or ‘support’: ‘it 
marks the moment of shock, of some unaccountable thing being “done”, finished, or 
posthumous—of stillness wrought from gesture’s movement’ (p. 32).  
In analysing the gesture of ‘touching a button’, Reckson draws a connection between 
photography, such Vander Weyde’s photographs of the ‘death chamber’ at Sing Sing, 
with literary works, such as James Welden Johnson’s The Auto-biography of an Ex-
colored Man (1912), to link the capturing of the photographic image with the use of the 
electric chair in the USA at the turn of the twentieth century. This study illuminates the 
violence, in particular racial violence, enacted in push-button technology. As Reckson 
notes, in the same year that Kodak began mass-producing cameras for the public, the 
first electric chair was being installed in the USA. In 1904, William Dean Howells made 
explicit the parallels between the act of photography and the act of killing in the use of 
the electric chair, with the separation of the one being photographed and the one to be 
killed from those on the other side of the wall where the button is located:  ‘With the 
lightest touch of a button, then, Howells linked the cultural shock of electrocution to the 
work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction: thrilling but also potentially numbing 
or deadening, and available to almost anyone’ (p. 37). Reckson points to the two sides 
of gesture: the affective touching and being touched. Just as touching a button can bring 
about finality, being touched can also represent the irreversible such as coming to see 
such a connection between the modern camera and the electric chair; photography is 
recast in that context as something which represents a disconnected act of deep 
significance. 
 
By thinking of gesture as performative, Reckson unites the affective with the political and 
ethical. Gestures are cultural phenomena that emerge and evolve over time: ‘Gestures 
make and unmake sense. Lodged in repetition and citation, they are themselves a kind of 
itinerant archive, testimony to the body’s historical and political conditioning’ (p. 57). 
Gestures can be performed as habitual and therefore begin to unmake sense through the 
automatization of action and in this sense a political act is performed with a sense of 
detachment and lack of understanding of its significance. In pointing the way forward, 
Reckson argues that the automatic ‘touching of buttons’ can be disrupted: ‘Lingering over 
such gestures, then, might offer its own performance of arrest: a way of holding out for 
different configurations of power, and of gesturing toward a future that might (still) be 
otherwise’ (p. 58) and so through such lingering or pausing, other expressions of power 
can come to the fore, allowing other possibilities to emerge. 
In The Minor Gesture, Erin Manning offers a further way of conceiving the 
phenomenology of ‘gesture’ as connected to political action through a connection with 
music and the relationship between the major and minor key; there are certain actions 
that show up in relation to more dominant actions, which are still themselves deeply 
significant. By paying attention to such gestures, despite their ‘minor’ status, enables 
new ways of being and expression to come to the fore, and moves us ‘beyond the 
neurotypical’ to embrace ‘neurodiversity’. By shifting attention from the dominance of 
knowledge and certainty to the emergence of thought through feeling, to produce 
‘affective tonality’ which shapes thought in relation to bodily movement, and allows 
diversity of experience to emerge and challenge that very dominance of preconceived 
knowledge: ‘A minor gesture that activates the collectively at the heart of thought 
effects change. It affects not only what the text can become: it alters to the core what 
thinking can do. It gives value to the processual uncertainty of thought as yet unformed, 
and gives that thought the space to develop collectively’ (p. x). 
 
The minor gesture ‘makes felt the unsayable in the said, brings into resonance field 
effects otherwise backgrounded in experience. It is the forward-force capable of 
carrying the affective tonality of nonconscious resonance and moving it toward the 
articulation, edging into consciousness, of new modes of existence’ (p. 7). It does not 
give expression to the unsayable directly but through affect in the moment of an event 
or act, which alters the shape of what is articulated.  
 
Affect also suggests a connection beyond the mere ethical to the political: ‘The register 
of the minor gesture is always political: in its punctual reorienting of the event, the minor 
gesture invents new modes of life-living. It moves through the event, creating a pulse, 
opening a new way for tendencies to emerge, and in the resonances that are awakened, 
potential for difference looms’ (p. 8). The minor gesture is always in relation to the 
dominant framework, perspective, narrative and so opens up a gap to something other and 
challenges those accepted categorisations and norms of thinking and perceiving. 
Manning highlights this political potential for minor gesture in her final chapter where 
she discusses the grand gestures of state apologies and reconciliation, which she argues 
reinforce the grand narrative that places such wrong-doing in the past and thereby fails to 
acknowledge how the grand narrative itself may be harmful and continues to act in the 
silencing of others: ‘Grand gestures operate within the bounds of the possible. They 
mobilize around the solidity of narrative already composed’ (p. 221). In contrast, minor 
gestures open up possibilities, and therefore become the signal for the site of change and 
unexpected movement to alternative narratives. 
As with Mirror Affect, reflecting on participatory art leads to a consideration of affect as 
related to the environment and therefore a broader kind of affective experience: ‘How do 
we make felt, for the human participant, a minor gesture that remains largely 
imperceptible? Does the work do its work if it cannot be readily experienced as such by 
the human?’ (p. 81). Affect needs to operate at a level that allows it to underpin/shape 
cognition rather than such a participant being aware of the resultant affect they are 
expected to feel; the feeling must be prior to cognition and expectation. But equally, 
Manning emphasises a kind of affect that brings to the fore a feeling of being a part of a 
larger environment, something relational, something that helps people to see themselves 
as part of something bigger. 
Both The Minor Gesture and Gestures of Testimony share in a project to investigate how 
to make the unsayable sayable, that is, how to express what resists being captured in 
language. Richardson connects affect with action via the illocutionary act of testimony, 
the practice of storytelling and the problematic nature of witness, when it is the attempt 
to witness something that cannot be externalised. Reflecting on works by Kafka, Orwell 
and Coetzee as well as poetry from detainees at Guantanamo alongside Elaine Scarry’s 
The Body in Pain and Brian Massumi’s Semblance and Event, this book focuses on the 
themes of torture, interrogation, detention and the resulting trauma in the post 9/11 world 
and the problematic nature of how to talk about what cannot be captured in representation, 
what is ‘unrepresentable’: ‘Torture performs the subjection of the body to power from 
which, perhaps, speech or representation become a near-impossible task. For the tortured, 
their sense of self is shattered … It returns in fragments, shards of the past that cannot 
become memory, only slip into the body and work their way deeper’ (p. 8). As Richardson 
notes, a representation may well be able to accurately document the events of torture ‘yet 
fail to account for its fundamental violence’ (p. 8). For one to succeed in an offer of 
testimony, he or she relies on language as the vehicle for such testimony. Experience of 
pain and trauma is felt in a bodily way which falls outside of what can be expressed in 
words: ‘To lose language is to lose the common ground of humanity, at least within the 
experience of pain and in its narration after its occurrence. This problem of narration 
intensifies the challenge of witnessing to possess veracity’ (p. 138). 
Richardson asks, how can literature enable one to bear witness to pain and trauma? What 
sorts of insights can literature offer? What modes of reading and writing torture can help 
overcome the problematic nature of expressing the incommunicable? Richardson invokes 
the notion of “literary witnesses” through engaging with novels that attempt to do just 
this.  
For Richardson, what literature can offer is ‘semblance’ of trauma, that is, not something 
that attempts to represent trauma, but recreates it in the experience it affords and spills 
over into the narrative and aesthetics of the work: ‘Writing torture, its affect and its pain, 
could mean writing fiction that is primarily affective, rather than symbolic, figural, or 
concerned with linguistic play. It means writing that gestures beyond the page, beyond 
language even’ (p. 155), and as Richardson notes, writing torture involves both the 
experience and expression of affect. 
The significance of such ‘literary witnesses’ is deeply political. Where the affective 
affordances tip over into action is in fiction’s potential to reshape the nature of debate and 
understanding of the concepts on which those debates are based to directly impact the 
political domain to help bring about justice. ‘Literature offers no salvation, but it can and 
must deepen our knowing and feeling’ (p. 24). Instead of attempting to accurately 
describe pain and trauma, literature’s role is in deepening our experience through 
response to such works, which impacts on our understanding of concepts of pain, torture, 
detention and isolation that underpin political debates beyond the literary context. 
 
5. Reflections 
What can be seen in the developments in affect theory in 2016 is a significant 
development of themes such as phenomenology of affect, especially in terms of 
developing deep analysis of individual affective states and revealing their potential 
utility; a politics of affect in terms of developing understanding of the influence of 
affect in intersubjectivity and cosubjectivity; and the nature of affect in bodily 
movement and action, further strengthening the connection between politics, ethics and 
affect. The field has shifted from a concern with a solitary, individualistic affect and 
affective intimacy to something with more global significant. Work in affect theory has 
relevance for the political and environmental challenges the modern age poses, one 
wherein the digital obstructs engagement with one another, and dampens the need for 
collective action and attention to the complexity of ambient noise. Where the digital 
threatens to obscure the meaning behind actions, affect sharpens the focus on what we 
need to attend to and the experiences they afford. 
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